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Abstract:  Most studies on the effect of incentives on risk attitude use within-subject designs.  
This may however raise an issue of sequentiality of effects as later choices may be influenced 
by earlier ones. This paper reports between-subject results on the effect of monetary stakes on 
risk attitudes for small probability prospects. Under low stakes, we find the typical risk 
seeking for small probabilities predicted by prospect theory. Under high stakes however risk 
seeking is dramatically reduced. This suggests that utility is not consistently concave over the 
outcome space, but may contain a convex section for very small amounts. 
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One issue that has been debated in the literature on decision making under risk is the effect of 
the provision of monetary incentives when studying risk attitudes. As for many other 
economic decisions (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2005; Kocher et 
al., 2008), the effect of incentives is a potentially contentious issue, since many of the 
traditional findings on risk attitudes have been obtained with hypothetical payoffs. 
 After many years of heated debate, a consensus on these issues is emerging. Incentives 
are generally thought to leave the qualitative findings obtained with hypothetical studies intact 
(Battalio et al., 1990). Quantitatively however, incentives seem to matter inasmuch as higher 
stakes increase risk aversion (Binswanger, 1980; Kachelmeier & Shahata, 1992). Also, while 
the size of real stakes matters, so do the nominal stakes in hypothetical choices (Kühberger et 
al., 2002; Holt & Laury, 2002). 
 Although these studies have produced a generally coherent view, some methodological 
doubts remain. Indeed, they all report results from within-subject investigations of risk 
attitudes. While within-subject investigations are statistically powerful, they pose an issue of 
sequentiality of effects as later choices may be influenced by earlier ones. For instance, 
Kachelmeier & Shehata remark how “the transparent manipulation of prize level may have 
acted as a cue to subjects that their responses should change” (p. 1131). Read (2005) criticizes 
Holt & Laury (2002) for repeatedly telling subjects that certain choices were hypothetical 
while others were real. 
 To the best of our knowledge, no systematic investigation of between-subject effects 
of different stakes on risk attitude exists. Without agreeing with arguments that consider 
between-subject data the gold standard to which all other results need to be compared 
(Poulton, 1973), we think that such data may provide additional insights. We thus present 
some results on the effect of stake-size on risk attitudes for small probability prospects. Even 
though our attention is restricted to small probabilities for budgetary reasons, the changes in 
stakes are substantial, ranging from prizes of €4 ($6) to prizes of €100 ($150). While finding 
the typical pattern of risk seeking for small probabilities under low monetary stakes, we show 




2. THE EXPERIMENT 
2.1 Method 
Subjects. The experiment was conducted at GATE, University of Lyon, France.  Four sessions 
were run, with 20 subjects in two of them and 19 subjects in the other two. 64% of subjects 
were female, the average age was 22.  On average subjects earned €22.58 for an experiment 
lasting less than 30 minutes. 
Tasks. Subjects absolved several tasks in the course of an experiment on probability 
representations that is described in Lefebvre et al. (2009). Since different probability 
representations were found to have no effect, we will not further discuss this. Two tasks 
relevant for this paper were used. First, a context-free neutral task was used to elicit certainty 
equivalents for a binary lottery giving a 10% probability of winning a prize and a 
complementary probability of winning nothing. Certainty equivalents were elicited through a 
list of 26 choices (see Appendix).  
 Next, subjects’ willingness to invest in a risky project was explored. Subjects were 
given an initial endowment, and the amount subjects were willing to invest was elicited 
through a list of 12 choices. Subjects were randomly assigned one of three probabilities of 
investment success ranging between 5.9% and 7%. Since ratios of elicited values to expected 
value (EV) are used for the analysis, this small variation in probabilities does not affect the 
results.  
Incentives. A show-up fee of €5 was provided to all subjects. In the Low-Stakes condition, the 
prizes were €10 ($15) for the neutral task, and €4 ($6) for the investment task, with the latter 
to be financed out of an initial endowment of €0.60 (90¢). In the High-Stakes condition, all 
amounts were increased by a factor of 10, implying prizes of €100 ($150) and €40 ($60) for 
the neutral and investment tasks, respectively. 
Encoding. The certainty equivalent (CE) and  the willingness-to-pay for investment (WTP) 
were calculated as the mean between the two amounts for which subjects switched from the 
prospect to the certain amount (in the case of CE), or from the certain amount to the prospect 
(in the case of WTP).  
Hypotheses. We expect that subjects will on average be risk seeking. Furthermore, we expect 





Neutral task. Six subjects were dropped from the sample because they switched multiple 
times between the sure amount and the prospect. Under low stakes, we find risk seeking 
behavior, with a mean ratio of CE to EV of 1.66. We thus strongly reject the hypothesis that 
subjects are expected value maximizers (t(39) = 8.53, p < 0.001; all p-values are two-sided) in 
favor of the hypothesis that subjects are risk seeking. Only two subjects out of 40 can be 
classified as risk averse, three as risk neutral, and the remaining 35 as risk seeking (see table 
1). 
 
Table 1: Classification of subjects in terms of risk attitude 
 













Low stakes 2  (5.00) 3 (7.50) 35 (87.50) 40 (100) 
Neutral task 
High stakes 14 (43.75) 6 (18.75) 12 (37.50) 32 (100) 
Low stakes 5 (12.50) 2 (5.00) 33 (82.50) 40 (100) 
Investment task 
High stakes 9 (26.47) 2 (5.88) 23 (67.65) 34 (100) 
Note: Relative frequencies in parentheses. 
 
In the High-Stakes condition, subject are approximately risk neutral with an average ratio of 
CE to EV of 0.96. The hypothesis of risk neutrality cannot be rejected (t(31) = – 0.44, p = 
0.67). 14 subjects can be classified as risk averse, six as risk neutral, and 12 as risk seeking. 
We thus confirm that in the High-Stakes condition subjects are on average significantly less 
risk seeking than in the Low-Stakes condition (z = 4.74, p < 0.001, Mann-Whitney test).  
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Figure 1: Ratio of CE to EV for Low and High Stakes 
 
Investment Task. Six subjects were eliminated because they switched several times between 
investing and not investing. Again, we find risk seeking under low stakes, with a mean ratio 
of WTP to EV of 1.88. We easily reject risk neutrality (t(37) = 6.05, p < 0.001). Five subjects 
can be classified as risk averse, two as risk neutral, and 33 as risk seeking (see Table 1). 
Under high stakes we now also find risk seeking, with the mean WTP to EV ratio equal to 
1.52. This time we reject risk neutrality also for high stakes (t(33) = 3.31, p = 0.002). Nine 
subjects are risk averse, two risk neutral, and 23 risk seeking. As hypothesized, subjects in the 
High-Stakes condition are on average less risk seeking than subjects in the Low-Stakes 
condition (z = 1.93, p = 0.05; Mann-Whitney test) (see also Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Proportion of subjects by WTP/EV ratio. 
 
3. DISCUSSION 
Our data confirm previous findings according to which individuals become more risk 
averse—or in our case less risk seeking—when high stakes are involved. This effect is very 
strong for a neutral task in which CEs are elicited. The effect is replicated in an investment 
task, though it is significantly less strong in the latter case  (Z = 1.49, p = 0.06, Fisher’s z 
test). Subjects are found to be risk seeking for small probabilities as predicted by the 
overweighting of small probabilities generally found in the literature (Abdellaoui, 2000; 
Bleichrodt & Pinto, 2000). While subjects become risk neutral under high incentives for the 
neutral task, they remain risk seeking for the investment task.  
 Under prospect theory the difference between low and high stakes can be explained 
with attitudes towards outcomes, since probability weighting is a purely probabilistic matter. 
The strong reduction in risk seeking we find is however somewhat troubling, since it is 
generally assumed that utility should be linear for such small amounts (Abdellaoui, et al., 
2008; Booij & van de Kuilen, 2009). A potential explanation would be that utility is not 
consistently concave over the outcome space, but rather contains a convex section for very 
small amounts (Bosch-Domènech & Silvestre, 1999; Markowitz, 1952). 
 According to this peanut effect (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; Weber & Chapman, 
2005), the extreme risk seeking found would be the result of an increasing marginal utility of 
money for the small amounts of money offered for sure. Notice how this conceptual 
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framework may also explain why we find a weaker effect of monetary stakes in the 
investment task. Indeed, sure amounts used in the latter are even smaller and may thus be 




Although several studies investigating the effect of high monetary stakes on risk attitude exist, 
data reported are generally obtained by means of within-subject designs, and doubts have 
been aired about the soundness of that approach. We test the effect of high monetary stakes 
for small probability prospects in a between-subject design. While finding the typical pattern 
of risk seeking for small probability prospects under low stakes, such risk seeking is found to 
be substantially reduced under high stakes. This could be explained either by a peanut effect, 
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